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Abstract—Deep learning has been used in the research of
malware analysis. Most classification methods use either static
analysis features or dynamic analysis features for malware family
classification, and rarely combine them as classification features
and also no extra effort is spent integrating the two types of
features. In this paper, we combine static and dynamic analy-
sis features with deep neural networks for Windows malware
classification. We develop several methods to generate static and
dynamic analysis features to classify malware in different ways.
Given these features, we conduct experiments with composite
neural network, showing that the proposed approach performs
best with an accuracy of 83.17% on a total of 80 malware families
with 4519 malware samples. Additionally, we show that using
integrated features for malware family classification outperforms
using static features or dynamic features alone. We show how
static and dynamic features complement each other for malware
classification.
I. INTRODUCTION
Malware is a threat to both individuals and industry; numer-
ous malware programs are detected every day. Many malware
programs share similar malicious behavior. Experts speculate
that such malware may have the same origin, that is, later
malware could be the result of modifications and mixtures
of existing malware. In order to better manage and analyze
malware, malware programs with similar attack patterns are
considered members of the same family. Once a new malware
program is discovered, a good practice is to first classify its
family to help analysts to comprehend the malware and devise
a mediation solution. If no family is identified, a new family
is created for the program.
Most malware analysis uses either static analysis, which
involves examining the malware program structure without
executing it, generating features such as API calls, strings,
header files, and call graphs; or dynamic analysis, which
involves executing the malware program and collecting ex-
ecution traces such as system and API call sequences and
their associated parameters. Both static and dynamic analysis
have their pros and cons: static analysis saves execution
costs but may be vulnerable to complex code obfuscation. In
dynamic analysis, in turn, running the malware program in a
sandbox takes time and resources. Few studies combine both
methods and optimize their effectiveness. In this study, we
apply features from both static and dynamic analysis, using
them to compensate for the shortcomings of each.
Deep learning is widely used in malware classification.
Methods for experimentation include random forest, SVM
(support vector machine), KNN (k-nearest neighbor), or other
common machine learning methods; rarely are more complex
modules used. In this study, we employ the composite neural
network framework, which is composed of several pre-trained
neural networks trained separately to solve part of the prob-
lem or the whole problem. Pre-trained neural network can
be defined that a deep neural network, after training on a
particular recognition task, can be applied on another domain.
Yang et al. [1] investigate the performance of composite
neural networks, finding a guaranteed high probability that the
performance of the composite network is better than any of its
pre-trained components. Here, inspired by their findings, we
use multiple pre-trained components with different topologies
for pragmatic performance evaluation.
In this paper, we consider a group of diverse features
extracted from static and dynamic analyses for Windows
malware classification. For static analysis, we first analyze
the malware to collect the API call statistics. This is because
code from family members generally has similar statistics;
thus this feature is useful for classifying malware with non-
sophisticated or non-major modifications. Then we extract
the procedure calling relation and generate a call graph,
represented by an adjacency matrix, after which we train a
graph embedding model to transform a call graph into its
embedding representation. Finally, for the adjacency matrix,
we further collect most of the signal information in the call
graph by using DCT (discrete cosine transform), which uses
zigzag scanning to gather low-frequency components as one
of the static features.
For dynamic analysis, we observe malware behavior by
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executing the malware program in a sandbox environment,
recording API call sequences and their associated parameters
as the program behavior in the form of a trace file. We
calculate the frequency of each API call in this trace file,
which we then use as a feature for family classification of
the program. We then use hierarchical attention networks to
process the trace file to generate an embedding representation,
after which we build a co-occurrence matrix based on the trace
file, and use a CNN (convolutional neural network) to extract
its structural features. Finally, based on paragraph vectors, we
use distributed representations of sentences and documents
to embed the trace file as a trace embedding, constructing
representations of variable-length input sequences.
This paper uses fusion neural network to build a malware
classification model. The network is divided into early fusion
neural network, late fusion neural network, and iterated fusion
neural network. The early fusion neural network takes the
features to be inputted into the classification model and then
connects to a classifier; the late fusion neural network takes
the results from the classification models, which can be seen
as pre-trained models, and further connects to a classifier;
finally, the iterated fusion neural network iteratively combines
two pre-trained neural networks into one and continues the
combination work until reaching the root of network. The
results show that the proposed approach performs best, with
a classification accuracy of 83.17% on malware family clas-
sification. We show that combining both static and dynamic
features to build a fusion neural network outperforms using
only static features or dynamic features for classification. We
show how static and dynamic features complement each other
in malware classification, and then compare using simple API
call sequences and API statement sequences to extract tempo-
ral characteristics, showing that most such approaches consider
only the API call sequence and not additional information that
could help the classifier. We show that considering the API call
sequence and its associated parameters with the proper deep
learning method outperforms using simple API call sequences
with deep learning. These are the contributions of our work:
• We propose classifying malware using several methods,
including deep learning to extract features using static
and dynamic analysis. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first paper to use static and dynamic analysis
features with fusion neural network to classify malware
on a Windows OS.
• We show that combining static and dynamic features
yields classification performance superior to that using
only static or dynamic features.
• We show how static and dynamic features complement
each other during malware classification.
• We compare using simple API call sequences and using
not only API call sequences but also their associated
parameters; the results show that considering additional
information in classification yields superior results.
II. RELATED WORK
In recent years, machine learning based malware classifica-
tion approaches have demonstrated high efficiency and accu-
racy. Usually such approaches consist of feature extraction and
a classification model. Researchers extract different features
from malware using static or dynamic analysis and then use
machine learning and standard deep learning approaches for
classification.
Static analysis, is used to examine the program without
executing it. De La Rosa et al. [2] proposed a meta model
that finds the simplest classifiers to characterize and assign
malware into their corresponding families, their classifier
features used three static analysis features to characterize a
malware, include basic, byte and assembly code to do malware
classification using their proposed meta-model. Hassen et
al. [3] proposed a new feature based on control statement
shingling with ordinary opcode n-gram based features to
classify malware. Yan et al. [4] proposed an approach that
using deep learning for malware detection which takes CNN
and LSTM(long short term memory) to automatically learning
features from the raw data, to get the file structure and code
sequence patterns, then they further used stacking ensemble to
combine networks results to optimize the detection accuracy.
Kabanga et al. [5] proposed a model that used machine learn-
ings convolution neural network to classify images extracted
from malware binaries. Kim et al. [6] proposed a transferred
generative adversarial network (tGAN) for automatic classifi-
cation and detection of the zero-day attack, and they to use
tGAN, they convert malware codes to images, called malware
images, used that as static analysis feature to train deep
neural network. And in dynamic analysis, it is the testing and
evaluation of a program by executing it and extract its program
behavior, Pascanu et al. [7] attempt to learn the language
of malware of detecting these unknown threats, they used a
recurrent model trained to predict next API call, and use the
hidden state of the model as the fixed-length feature vector to
train a classifier and that classifier made by MLP(multi-layer
perceptron), one standard method of deep learning. Tobiyama
et al. [8] proposed a malware process detection method using
process behavior to detect whether a terminal is infected or
not, they used two types of DNN, one is RNN to extract
feature in program, the other one is CNN, it is used to do
classification based on the aforementioned feature. Alsulami
et al. [9] contributed to behavioral malware classification using
information gathered from Microsoft Windows Prefetch files,
then they used Convolutional Recurrent Neural Networks to
build their classification model. Agrawal et al. [10] proposed
a neural model that takes variable-length input sequences of
system API calls, then they implement a version of Convoluted
Partitioning of Long Sequences(CPoLS) which can capture
sequences of any variable length to do malware classification.
Smith et al. [11] examined several machine learning techniques
for detecting malware including random forest, deep learning
techniques, and liquid state machines, with system API calls.
Stokes et al. [12] implement and study several learning-based
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attacks and defenses for dynamic analysis, then applied deep
learning method to do classification. There also have methods
that combine both static and dynamic analysis features to do
malware detection or classification, such as Yuan et al. [13]
proposed to combine the static analysis features and features
from dynamic analysis of Android apps and then using deep
learning techniques to do malware detection. Chakraborty et
al. [14] used ensemble clustering and classification to classify
malware, also show how to characterize different malware
families by extracting family-specific features that distinguish
one family from others, but this study did not emphasize the
benefits of using both static and dynamic analysis to classify
only mention when under certain circumstance with hybrid
analysis will perform better. Onwuzurike et al. [15] used online
system with a little modify to obtain both static and dynamic
features, then apply random forest to classify malware, though
it have phenomenon of granularity in static and dynamic anal-
ysis, it only consider random forest as classification method,
didn’t apply complex classification methods such as deep
learning with more comprehensive view to do classification.
In building a deep learning based classification model,
standard classic methods include SVM, random forest, KNN,
CNN, RNN, and MLP. As deep learning has grown in pop-
ularity, many novel methods based on deep learning have
been proposed that increase efficiency and accuracy. One
example is ensemble learning, in which learning algorithms
construct a set of classifiers and then classify new data points
and use methods such as taking a vote on their predictions.
Krawczyk et al. [16] proposed a lightweight and flexible
abstaining extension for online ensembles that allows ex-
cluding some classifiers from the voting process. And multi-
view learning [17], it means by learning from multi-view
data by considering the different features. Elkahky et al. [18]
proposed a novel deep learning approach extended from the
Deep Structured Semantic Models (DSSM) to map users and
items to a shared semantic space and recommend items that
have maximum similarity with users in the mapped space.
To the best of our knowledge, most research on malware
classification uses either static or dynamic analysis as features
to classify malware directly; rarely do some extra effort on
these features. Classification methods usually use standard
machine learning or deep learning methods such as SVM,
random forest, KNN, CNN, and RNN, and not complex
methods such as composite neural networks. Hence, in our
approach, we propose combining static and dynamic analysis
features using fusion neural network for use in Windows
malware classification.
III. PROPOSED FRAMEWORK
A. Static analysis
We divide static analysis into two aspects: call graphs
and API calls that might appear in a PE file. We further
use two methods to extract from the call graph with two
different feature sets that characterize its structure: call graph
embedding with deep neural networks, and low-frequency
regions from the call graph.
1) API calls appear in PE:
The behavior of members of a given family of malware is
similar, although malware authors may use techniques such as
code obfuscation to avoid detection. We apply PEframe [19],
an open source tool for PE file static analysis, to extract static
properties such as the API calls used in the malware. As there
are 251 different API calls found in the malware corpus, a
vector of 252 slots, in addition to UNKNOWN for all other API
calls, is used for a one-hot encoding of the API call indicators,
with 1 meaning the API is in the malware and 0 otherwise.
2) DNN-based call graph embedding:
The call graph (CG) is a representation of the function call re-
lations among problem blocks; it is essential in static analysis.
In this study, we obtain the CG using radare2 [20], a complete
framework for PE file reverse-engineering and analysis. We
implemented a program to generate the adjacency matrix for
the CG. Inspired by the autoencoder technique, which learns
the characteristics of the training data in an unsupervised way,
we propose the deep neural network shown in Fig. 1. The front
stage is a CNN to catch significant patterns in the adjacency
matrix, and the rear stage is an autoencoder composed of an
encoder and decoder. The encoder maps the input into a lower
dimensional internal representation, and decoder reverses the
representation to reconstruct the original input. We term this
model a CaFC (convoluted and fully connected) model. The
encoder of the trained CaFC model is used as the call graph
embedding model.
Fig. 1. CaFC (convolution and fully connect)
3) Low-frequency CG regions:
We use a non-training method to obtain the CG characteristics.
Inspired by JPEG (joint photographic experts group), the most
widely used image compression method on the Internet, we
apply its most important parts. The first is DCT (discrete
cosine transform), which compacts the energy inside the
image; in typical applications, most of the signal information
is concentrated on a few low-frequency DCT components. The
second is zigzag scanning, by which low-frequency coeffi-
cients are grouped after using DCT. These two methods are
used to extract low-frequency characteristics (here termed low-
frequency regions) from the CG. Fig. 2 shows how we extract
such low-frequency CG regions.
B. Dynamic analysis
For dynamic analysis, we use Cuckoo sandbox [21], the
leading open-source automated malware analysis system.
Cuckoo yields the following features:
• API calls made by all malware processes
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Fig. 2. Extraction of low-frequency CG regions. DCT is used to transform
the call graph adjacency matrix into its DCT representation, after which we
use zigzag scanning to scan low-frequency regions into a vector.
• Filenames created, deleted, and downloaded by malware
• Malware memory dumps
• Network traffic
In this work, to monitor PE file behavior, we gather the
API calls that are made along with their parameters into the
trace file, which we use as the foundation of further processes
to extract malware characteristics. We propose a total of four
methods to process the trace file: API call frequency, PV-based
trace embedding, a DNN-based co-occurrence matrix, and an
API statement sequence encoder.
1) API call frequency:
We calculate the frequency of each API call in each file. As
there are 286 different API calls in our trace file training data
set, for each file, we first build a vector of length 287, one
element of which is UNKNOWN. Each different API call is
given an index. The API call frequencies are yielded by taking
as the denominator the total number of API calls in the trace
file, and taking as the numerator the number of times each
API call appears in the trace file.
2) PV-based trace embedding:
Use of language models with deep neural network has been
demonstrated by [7], [22] on malware detection or classi-
fication tasks. In our work, the trace files are composed of
a series of API call sequences and their parameters. In this
section, we take a series of API calls as a document, and
introduce a paragraph vector (PV) by which to embed our
trace file. For the paragraph vector we make use of an un-
supervised learning algorithm that learns fixed-length feature
representations from variable-length text segments [23]. It
learns paragraph and document embedding via the distributed
memory and distributed bag-of-words models, both of which
are implemented using a deep neural network. After training
the paragraph vector model, we use the model to embed our
trace into a trace embedding (here termed a PV-based trace
embedding).
3) Co-occurrence matrix with DNN:
API call co-occurrences suggest that the API calls are closely
related and could constitute certain action(s) which can be
used to classify the malware family, as different malware
families have different actions. For this reason, we use the co-
occurrence matrix, which is composed of the frequency of term
co-occurrences in a given order. We first build a co-occurrence
matrix based on the trace file, after which we build a DNN
model to extract the characteristics of the co-occurrence ma-
trix. As shown in fig. 3, this model is composed of four layers:
a max pooling layer for downsampling, a convolution layer to
extract significant events within the matrix, a flatten layer to
turn data into a one-dimensional array, and a fully connected
layer to extract features from the previous layer. The training
target of this model is malware family classification. After
training this model, we use it as a pre-trained model.
Fig. 3. Model to extract characteristics from co-occurrence matrix. The model
uses max pooling to downsample the co-occurrence matrix, convolution to
extract spatial features, flattening to represent the data in one dimension, and
a fully connected layer to generate features from the co-occurrence matrix.
4) API statement sequence encoder:
The trace file consists of an API statement sequence, that
is, a sequence of API calls and their parameters. Following
Yang’s [24] approach, we propose the model in Fig. 4, termed
an API statement sequence model. We train the model as a pre-
trained model to encode the trace file’s temporal series features
to a fixed-length numerical vector as a representation of the
malware program’s behavior. Trained to classify malware, the
model can be divided into an API statement encoder (SE)
and an API statement sequence encoder (SSE). The API SE
calculates the attention weight [25] of each API call and its
parameters using a bi-directional LSTM and a context weight
matrix. The inner product is used to calculate the output from
the bi-directional LSTM and the context weights to generate
the attention weights. The API SE uses the following notation:
• API l: The l-th API call.
• plr: Parameter r of API call l.
•
−→
h : LSTM hidden state from beginning to end.
•
←−
h : LSTM hidden state from end to beginning.
• uap: The context weight matrix of the API calls and their
parameters.
• alr: The attention weight of API call l and parameter r.
Given the attention weight of each API call and its param-
eters, we build an API statement sequence encoder to encode
each API statement in the trace file and generate attention
weights for each API statement. The architecture of the API
SSE depends on how many API statements are in the trace
file. For each API statement, we calculate its API statement
embedding using the attention weights from the API SE and
the output from the bi-directional LSTM, using the inner
product as the API statement embedding. Then, given every
API statement embedding, we use the inner product of the
bi-directional LSTM and another context weight matrix to
generate the attention weight, after which we calculate the
API call sequence embedding as the inner product of the API
statement attention weight and the output of the bi-directional
LSTM. Given the API call sequence embedding, we use a
fully connected layer with softmax activations to classify the
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Fig. 4. API statement sequence model. Following Yang’s [24] approach, the
training target is malware classification. It is divided into an API statement
encoder (SE) and an API statement sequence encoder (SSE). After training,
we use the API SE to extract characteristics from API statement, then using the
API SSE to extract the temporal characteristics from API statement sequence.
malware. This constitutes the API call sequence model, the
notation for which is as follows.
• APIs l: The l-th API statement in the trace file.
•
−→
h : LSTM hidden state from beginning to end.
•
←−
h : LSTM hidden state from end to beginning.
• uas: The context weight matrix of API statement.
• al: The attention weight of API statement l.
After training, we use the API SE and API SSE as tools to
extract API call sequence embedding.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
Here we describe the data collection and labeling, the setting
of tunable features, and the results from different composite
neural networks. We compare static features, dynamic features,
and integrated features, and also compare the API statement
sequence encoder with the API call sequence encoder.
A. Data Collection and Labeling
As shown in fig. I, we used 80 malware families with a total
of 4519 malware samples collected by the National Center
for High-Performance Computing (NCHC) [26], Taiwan, the
distribution has shown our data are most balanced. We used
traces provided by Cuckoo Sandbox and record only system
API calls in our scenario. As there is no ground truth for
malware families, Hsiao et al. [27] [28] leverage peer voting
on labels from popular intrusion detection systems (IDSs) to
determine malware families, which is shown to be better than
most IDS labels; we adopted their malware family classifica-
tion as the family label in our work, there are some notable
malware family in our data set, such as malware family fakeav
with 188 samples, ramnit with 90 samples, etc. In all reported
experiments, we divided our data into 3661 training data, 407
validation data, and 451 testing data, and applied ten-fold cross
validation to build our models.
TABLE I
MALWARE FAMILY SAMPLES QUANTITY DISTRIBUTION
Distribution of malware samples # of family belong to this distribution
0 ∼ 50 49
51 ∼ 100 19
101 ∼ 150 7
151 ∼ 200 2
201 ∼ 250 1
251 ∼ 300 1
301 ∼ 350 1
B. Setting Tunable Features
Some of our features are tunable and some are not tunable.
“Tunable” means we can tune the length of the feature vector
to determine which length best fits our classification task. For
non-tunable features, the feature vector’s length is fixed. To
determine the length of a tunable feature, we trained a malware
classification model—in this case a single fully connected
layer using softmax activations—using various feature lengths,
and used the length which performed best as the final feature
length. The tunable features in our work are low-frequency
CG regions, DNN-based CG embedding, PV-based trace em-
bedding, the DNN-based co-occurrence matrix, and the API
statement sequence encoder. We review these separately.
1) DNN-based call graph embedding:
In this part, the tunable feature is the number of filters in the
convolution layer. We determined the number of feature maps
by deciding the number of kernels. In a CNN, kernels capture
the different features of the call graph. We experimented with
3 kernels to 7 kernels to determine which number of kernels
performs better on malware family classification. As shown in
the table II, choosing 4 filters yielded the best performance.
TABLE II
ACCURACY WITH KERNELS OF DNN-BASED CALL GRAPH EMBEDDING
Number of kernels Accuracy
3 31.31%
4 31.42%
5 31.22%
6 31.24%
7 30.93%
2) Low-frequency Call Graph regions:
For low-frequency CG regions, we tuned the scanning length
in zigzag scanning, as shown in Fig. 2. The scanning length
determines how many low-frequency region we want to use.
We experimented with lengths from 150 to 350 for malware
classification. As shown in the table III, choosing 350 as the
scanning length yielded the best performance.
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TABLE III
ACCURACY WITH ZIGZAG SCANNING LENGTHS OF LOW-FREQUENCY CG
REGIONS
Zigzag scanning length Accuracy
150 31.12%
200 31.13%
250 31.18%
300 30.75%
350 31.26%
400 31.06%
3) PV-based trace embedding:
For PV-based trace embedding, we chose the size of the em-
bedding while training the paragraph vector. We experimented
with sizes from 100 to 500. and the result has shown in
table IV. An embedding size of 400 performed best.
TABLE IV
ACCURACY WITH EMBEDDING SIZES OF PV-BASED TRACE EMBEDDING
Embedding size Accuracy
100 74.63%
200 75.74%
300 75.21%
400 76.01%
500 75.39%
4) DNN-based co-occurrence matrix:
For the DNN-based co-occurrence matrix, as shown in fig 3,
after turning the trace file into a co-occurrence matrix, we use
it to train a classification model as a pre-trained model for
malware classification. For this we tuned the pooling size of
the model’s max pooling layer. We tested sizes from 8 to 32.
As shown in the table V, a pooling size of 4 performed best.
TABLE V
RESULT OF ACCURACY WITH POOLING SIZES OF CO-OCCURRENCE
MATRIX
pooling size Accuracy
4 59.43%
8 61.70%
16 56.48%
32 44.63%
5) API statement sequence encoder:
For this we tuned the number of API statements in the
trace file, which we use to train the API statement sequence
model for malware classification. We experimented with API
statement sequence lengths from 100 to 400. As shown in
the table VI, although a length of 300 yielded the best
performance, the execution time for 200 was much shorter
than that of 300; thus we chose a sequence length of 200,
even though it was slightly outperformed by 300.
C. Experimental Results with Different Composite Neural
Network Models
After tuning features, we build the classification model.
There are many ways to accomplish this; in this paper, we
use composite neural networks, which consist of early fusion
model and late fusion model with different topology. And
TABLE VI
ACCURACY WITH SEQUENCE LENGTHS IN API STATEMENTS SEQUENCE
ENCODER.
Sequence length Accuracy
100 65.70%
200 67.92%
300 68.08%
400 64.74%
in the training phase, we tune the hyperparameters of every
model shown in the table VII. These hyperparameters control
the regularization used for each DNN layer, the dropout rate,
whether batch normalization is used, and how many hidden
layers to use and how many neurons in each layer, we also
use ten-fold cross validation in every experiments. In addition,
we further take SVM, random forests, and late fusion ensemble
learning as baseline methods for comparison with the proposed
models. All the aforementioned methods we test with static
features, dynamic features and integrated features, to see
whether integrated features will help the classification task
mostly.
TABLE VII
THE TUNABLE HYPER-PARAMETER.
Tuning parameter Tuning ranges
Activation of each layer relu, sigmoid, tanh, softmax, linear
Regulization 0 ˜ 0.001
Dropout rate of each layer 0 ˜ 0.5
Batch normalization layer yes, no
Weight setting fixed, trainable
1) SVM and Random Forest:
SVM is a learning model that analyzes data used for clas-
sification and regression analysis. The result has shown in
table VIII, we can see though dynamic features based SVM
model slightly lower than integrated features based SVM
model, integrated features perform the best accuracy with
SVM model.
TABLE VIII
SVM CLASSIFICATION RESULT
Features Accuracy Top-3 accuracy
Integrated 73.29% 78.60%
Static 68.73% 73.93%
Dynamic 73.09% 78.40%
The random forest algorithm is a classic method for classifi-
cation, regression, and other tasks that operates by constructing
a multitude of decision trees. The result has shown in table IX,
just like SVM model, integrated features performs better.
TABLE IX
RANDOM FOREST CLASSIFICATION RESULT
Features Accuracy Top-3 accuracy
Integrated 77.45% 82.76%
Static 67.65% 75.73%
Dynamic 77.50% 79.40%
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2) Late Fusion Ensemble Learning:
We use late fusion ensemble learning with trained weights and
fixed weights. Firstly, we use the proposed seven features to
train seven pre-trained models, the goal of which is malware
classification. The length of the output of each is equal to the
number of malware families, and represents the probability of
each malware family, their pre-trained models architectures are
all the same but with separate training. The last layer is the
fully connected 80-node softmax layer. As the result shown in
the table X.
TABLE X
MALWARE CLASSIFICATION MODELS TRAINED BY EACH FEATURE.
Feature name Accuracy
API calls appear in PE 63.75%
Call graph embedding with DNN 31.42%
Low frequency region from call graph 31.26%
API call frequency 72.18%
PV-based trace embedding 76.01%
Co-occurrence matrix with DNN 59.43%
API statement sequence encoder 67.92%
After training, we take every pre-trained models’ (total 7
pre-trained models) single output (1 of 80) to concatenate
them into one vector, which we then use to train a one-
versus-all classifier which indicates whether it belongs to the
family or not. Thus we train 80 classifiers, one for each
family in our dataset. From these classifiers we choose the
highest probability as the predicted label. We use both fixed
and trainable weights in the classifier. For fixed weights, we
set all weights equally, and use that weight for malware
classification. Trainable weights are initialized using a random
uniform distribution and are then updated during training.
Fig 5 is used for late fusion ensemble learning using static and
dynamic features to do classification. Late Fusion Ensemble
Learning structure with integrated features. we take the single
output (1 of 80) of every pre-trained models (total 7 pre-
trained models) to concatenate them into one vector to train
a one-versus-all classifier which indicates whether it belongs
to the family or not. The multicolored line represent the
individual output of each model, shaded gray blocks represent
pre-trained layers and dashed arrows represent fixed weights.
To further compare between integrated features, static features
and dynamic features on classification task, we conducts the
same experiments using static features and dynamic features
separately.
Fig. 5. Late Fusion Ensemble Learning structure with integrated features.
The results shown in table XI, dynamic features based late
fusion ensemble learning almost be on an equal footing with
integrated features based late fusion ensemble learning, though
static features based late fusion ensemble learning is a lot
lower than dynamic features based, but when integrated both
of them, will perform better.
TABLE XI
LATE FUSION ENSEMBLE LEARNING CLASSIFICATION RESULTS
Features Acc Top-3 Acc
Integrated with trainable weight 74.70% 89.84%
Static with trainable weight 64.92% 82.84%
Dynamic with trainable weight 74.05% 88.25%
Integrated with fixed weight 72.79% 88.63%
Static with fixed weight 27.76% 51.97%
Dynamic with fixed weight 71.04% 89.14%
3) Early fusion neural network:
In the early fusion neural network, we propose two late fusion
neural network models shown in fig 6 and fig 7. In early
fusion neural network 1, the features are concatenated as a
vector paaed through a fully connected layer for malware
classification. After concatenate all these features, we use a
softmax layer with shape 80 to classify our malware. The
compared results of integrated features, dynamic features and
static features are shown in table XII that the integrated model
performs the best result in our experiment.
Fig. 6. Early fusion neural network 1 with integrated features.
TABLE XII
EARLY FUSION NEURAL NETWORK 1 CLASSIFICATION RESULT
Features Acc Top-3 Acc
Integrated with trainable weight 83.17% 90.53%
Static with trainable weight 66.63% 83.48%
Dynamic with trainable weight 81.81% 89.80%
In fig 7, our design idea is we choose the two pre-trained
models with the poorest accuracy: the models using the DNN-
based CG embedding and the low-frequency CG regions.
The order of the model results from bottom left to upper
right is in ascending accuracy: low-frequency CG regions
(31.26%), DNN-based CG embedding (31.42%), DNN-based
co-occurrence matrix (59.43%), API calls in PE (63.75%), API
statement sequence encoder (67.92%), API call frequencies
(dynamic side, 72.18%), and the PV-based trace embedding
(76.01%). Solid arrows represent trainable weights. We con-
catenate the output of these two models to concatenate a
FC layer, then we concatenate the output from the first step
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with the output from the next worst model’s output—in this
case, that for the API statement sequence encoder—to connect
another FC layer. Continuing in this fashion, we build early
fusion neural network 2. The compared result of integrated
features, dynamic features and static features are shown in
table XIII, in this model structure, we can see dynamic based
structure beats the integrated based structure. We believe the
reason is in integrated feature based structure, we have too
many pre-trained layers, and layer by layer stack it up, the
result may have been formed earlier step, so will cause the
poor result.
Fig. 7. Early fusion neural network 2 with integrated features.
TABLE XIII
EARLY FUSION NEURAL NETWORK 2 CLASSIFICATION RESULT
Features Acc Top-3 Acc
Integrated with trainable weight 80.71% 88.69%
Static with trainable weight 66.08% 81.81%
Dynamic with trainable weight 81.15% 87.58%
4) Late fusion neural network:
In the late fusion neural network, just like late fusion ensemble
learning, we use the seven features to train seven models
separately. The training goal of every model is malware
classification, and their architectures are all the same but with
separate training. The last layer is the fully connected 80-node
softmax layer. As the result shown in the table X, we now
have seven pre-trained models, the results of which we use to
classify malware. We thus propose the two late fusion neural
network models shown in figures 8 and 9.
In fig. 8, we choose the two pre-trained models with
the poorest accuracy: the models using the DNN-based CG
embedding and the low-frequency CG regions. We concatenate
the output of these two pre-trained models to build a new
pre-trained model, the target of which is also malware clas-
sification. Then we concatenate the output from the first step
with the output from the next worst pre-trained model—in this
case, that for the API statement sequence encoder—to build
another new pre-trained model. Continuing in this fashion,
we build late fusion neural network 1. We also compare the
performance with static features and dynamic features, as
shown in table XIV.
Fig. 8. Late fusion neural network 1 with integrated feature.
TABLE XIV
LATE FUSION NEURAL NETWORK 1 CLASSIFICATION RESULT
Features Acc Top-3 Acc
Integrated with trainable weight 74.50% 85.81%
Static with trainable weight 32.15% 57.70%
Dynamic with trainable weight 46.34% 54.10%
For late fusion neural network 2, as shown in fig 9, as in
fig. 6, we concatenate the outputs of the pre-trained models
to a vector which is fed to a classifier with a fully connected
layer and softmax activations for malware classification. The
difference between this figure and fig. 6 is that here, we use
the results of the pre-trained models, which are trained by the
tunable and non-tunable features, and then concatenate these
results as a vector of length 560 (80 families × 7 models)
which is fed to a fully connected layer for classification,
And for the aspect of compare static, dynamic and integrated
features, and result has shown in table XV, we can see when
used integrated features based model structure performs best
result.
Fig. 9. Late fusion neural network 2 with integrated features.
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TABLE XV
LATE FUSION NEURAL NETWORK 2 CLASSIFICATION RESULT
Features Acc Top-3 Acc
Integrated with trainable weight 77.89% 89.80%
Static with trainable weight 69.18% 81.59%
Dynamic with trainable weight 77.16% 88.92%
5) Iterative fusion neural network:
As its name implies, iterative fusion neural network itera-
tively combines two pre-trained neural networks into one and
continues the combination work until reaching the root of
network. We propose the models shown in fig 10 and 11.
In fig. 10, it is a tree structure model with the final layer as
the root of tree. On the right half of the tree we choose the
trace embedding feature because using this feature to train the
malware classifier yields the best performance; thus we want
it to be closer to the root. The left half of the tree is also a
tree structure: a pre-trained model for malware classification.
Likewise for this tree’s left and right halves: these are also pre-
trained models, the difference being that one is mainly static
analysis and the other dynamic analysis. The left half uses
features from the CG embedding and low-frequency regions
in the pre-trained model, and after training, concatenates the
output of this pre-trained model with the API call features
to train another malware classifier. In the right half of this
tree, the co-occurrence matrix and the API statement sequence
encoder are used to train a pre-trained model, the output of
which is combined with the API call frequencies to train this
tree structure model. Training the left half of the iterated
fusion neural network in this way allows us to investigate
the performance when static features and dynamic features
are trained separately and then combined. And the result has
shown in tab XVI, we can see integrated features performs
best.
TABLE XVI
ITERATIVE FUSION NEURAL NETWORK 1 CLASSIFICATION RESULT
Features Acc Top-3 Acc
Integrated with trainable weight 77.60% 85.14%
Static with trainable weight 32.15% 57.70%
Dynamic with trainable weight 46.34% 54.10%
Fig. 11 is similar to Fig. 8, the difference being that in fig. 8,
every tunable and non-tunable feature is used to train a pre-
trained model, the outputs are which are then used in further
operations. In fig. 11, however, we use the features directly.
As in fig. 8, the order from bottom left to upper right is in
ascending accuracy. And the results has shown in tab XVII,
as we can see the static and dynamic results are same with
tab XVI is because when they build static and dynamic based
structure will share the same structure, so the results will be
the same.
In the table XVIII, we put every based on integrated features
models’ accuracy together, the best result has shown using
early fusion neural network 1 yields a classification accuracy
of 83.17% and a top-3 accuracy of 90.53%, outperforming the
Fig. 10. Iterated fusion neural network 1.
TABLE XVII
ITERATIVE FUSION NEURAL NETWORK 2 CLASSIFICATION RESULT
Features Acc Top-3 Acc
Integrated with trainable weight 79.37% 87.36%
Static with trainable weight 32.15% 57.70%
Dynamic with trainable weight 46.34% 54.10%
Fig. 11. Iterated fusion neural network 2. Features yielding higher accuracy
are located closer to the classifier, so that features yielding lower accuracies
are forced to pass through more models to aid the final classifier.
baseline methods. Also, most fusion neural network models
perform better than the baseline methods, but the late fusion
neural network 1 is outperformed by one of the baseline
methods. This was due to degradation caused by an excessive
number of layers and too many trainable weights. Thus when
building a complex neural network such as those in our
experiment, the neural network structure should closely fit the
scenario.
D. How Static and Dynamic Features Work Together
Next, we show how static and dynamic features complement
each other. We consider the following cases:
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TABLE XVIII
COMPARISON OF RESULTS BETWEEN EACH CLASSIFICATION METHODS.
Classification model Acc Top-3 Acc
Early fusion neural network 1 83.17% 90.53%
Early fusion neural network 2 80.71% 88.69%
Late fusion neural network 1 74.50% 85.80%
Late fusion neural network 2 77.89% 89.80%
Iterated fusion neural network 1 77.60% 85.14%
Iterated fusion neural network 2 79.37% 87.36%
Ensemble learning with trainable weight 75.60% 89.57%
Ensemble learning with fixed weight 72.79% 88.62%
SVM 73.29% 78.60%
Random forest 77.45% 82.76%
1) Failure to classify malware with only dynamic features,
or only static features.
2) Success classifying malware with static feature.
3) Success classifying malware with integrated features.
The first case is from the ‘softplus’ malware family. Al-
though this was not classified as malware with either static
or dynamic features, it was successfully classified as malware
with integrated features, as shown in fig. 12.
Fig. 12. Case 1 of static and dynamic features working together. Vertical axis
is probability and horizontal axis is each malware family. Static features err
egregiously, assigning a low probability to ‘softplus’ and predicting the wrong
malware family. Dynamic features also mispredict the family. Integrated
features eliminate probabilities for other families and predict the right one.
Case 2 is from the ‘firseria’ malware family. As shown in
fig. 13, this malware program is successfully classified using
static features, is misclassified using dynamic features, and is
successfully classified using integrated features.
Fig. 13. Case 2 of static and dynamic features working together. Static
features predict the family successfully, but dynamic features assign a low
probability to ‘firseria’. Integrated features preserve the good result from static
features, assigning a high probability to ‘firseria’.
In case 3, for the ‘elkern’ malware family, the malware
program is misclassified using static features and successfully
classified using dynamic features as well as integrated features,
as shown in fig. 14.
We thus observe that this methodology makes comple-
mentary use of most static and dynamic features for mal-
ware family classification. It eliminates erroneous probabilities
when integrating both features for malware classification and
prevents bad results from single features from affecting the
final integrated results.
Fig. 14. Case 3 of static and dynamic features working together. As in case
2, dynamic features predict the family successfully. For the static features
result, although it predicts the wrong family, it assigns a high probability
to ‘elkern’. Integrated features result correct the static features’ erroneous
probabilities and retain the good probabilities.
E. Comparison Between API Statement Sequence Encoder
and API Call Sequence Encoder
We further compare using the API statement sequence
encoder with simply using the API call sequence without
the associated parameters to encode the trace file’s temporal
characteristics using LSTM. This is because recent methods
for malware classification use deep learning based dynamic
analysis with simple API call sequences, and do not consider
important details such as the associated parameters.
For the simple API call sequence method, we use an API
call sequence model that, like most papers, uses RNN to
encode the API call sequence. We conduct experiments using
LSTM to learn long-term dependencies. The API call sequence
encoder encodes temporal series features as a fixed-length
numerical vector that represents the malware behavior. As
a feature of this method, we choose the length of the API
calls in the trace file, which determines how many API calls
we evaluate in the experiment. Fig. 15 shows our API call
sequence model structure. The model, which is trained to
classify malware families, is taken as a pre-trained model after
training, and called the API call sequence encoder. With it we
extract API call sequence embedding as a feature.
Fig. 15. API call sequence model. The first m API call sequences are used
for LSTM model training, after which we take this model as a pre-trained
model with which to extract temporal characteristics.
Shown in the table XIX are the training results. In this
experiment, we set the sequence length to equal that of the
API statement sequence. Regardless of the length, the API
call sequence encoder is outperformed by the API statement
sequence encoder. This clearly shows that considering both the
API call and its associated parameters aids in classification.
This mirrors the situation in text analysis, in which we not
only take into consideration the text itself; for useful analysis
we must also determine its actual meaning.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose both static and dynamic analysis
features for malware classification. We experiment with sev-
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TABLE XIX
COMPARISON OF RESULTS BETWEEN API CALL SEQUENCE AND API
STATEMENT SEQUENCE.
sequence length Acc of API call Acc of API statement
100 44.01% 65.70%
200 48.03% 67.92%
300 50.90% 68.80%
400 48.00% 64.74%
eral ways to use the data obtained from static and dynamic
analysis as features for classification. In the experimental
results, we use several classification algorithms, including
SVM, random forest, late fusion ensemble learning and fusion
neural network. The results show that the proposed approach
performs best, with an accuracy of 83.17%. We demonstrate
that when classifying malware, using integrated features works
better than simply using static analysis features or dynamic
analysis features, thus, providing different orientations aids in
malware classification. We also show how static and dynamic
features complement each other. Finally, we prove that the
best malware classification performance comes when using not
only the API call sequence but also its associated parameters.
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